And now, from a fantastically detailed post onto ProMED by Fonseca and colleagues, we see that the H5N1 case was diagnosed with pneumonia.
On 28-Dec, the patient presented to a local emergency department.
"A chest X-ray and CT scan revealed a right apical infiltrate. A diagnosis of pneumonia was made; the patient was prescribed levofloxacin and discharged home."
One sad point made in the ProMED post which supports the need for constant viral vigilance the world over, coupled with the dissemination of those surveillance data, so that patient management anywhere in the world can be armed with the best possible decision-making information...
"The index of suspicion was low as travel was to an area in China where there have been no recent reports of the circulation of this virus, and coupled with no obvious exposure to poultry, the diagnostic work-up and consideration for A(H5N1) infection was very low"
As a recent J Virology article by Yu and colleagues highlights, when a sensitive testing method like the polymerase chain reaction (PCR; in this case RT-PCR because influenza viruses all have an RNA genome, not a DNA one) is applied to the search for a virus, it yields the kind of data that can:
- Explain from where a virus emerges
- Inform the search for disease aetiology - where are human cases getting infected from and if a zoonotic infection (from animals to humans), which animal(s) is the culprit?
- Alert the world to any risks of infection when travelling to a certain area(s)
- Allow the local health departments to mitigate the risk of their population acquiring infection by instigating controls (like live bird market closures). This has implications for the world since respiratory viruses have the potential (thankfully not realized for H7N9 or H5N1 to date) to spread more rapidly and efficiently that blood-borne or mosquito-borne or sexually transmitted viruses.
- Permit understanding of how widespread (over what geographic area is it detected) a novel or emerging virus may be and how entrenched (is the same site repeatedly positive) it is
Not doing such testing, or using less sensitive methods will not yield this information.
In Yu's study, testing of 12 poultry markets, mostly urban, and local farms linked to 10 human infections in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province around 4th to 20th April 2013 yielded signs of H9N2, H7N9 and/or H5N1 viruses in all markets. Poultry were often positive for H7N9 and H9N2 (this finding from individual RT-PCRs was confirmed using next generation sequencing), whereas human specimens were not. These levels hadn't been turned up when 899,000 bird were tested in 2013 using (perhaps) less sensitive methods.
I think with influenza, it may be safer to presume its everywhere until that presumption can be discounted. Clearly the conditions for influenza viruses to swap gene segments and sort themselves into new subtypes and variants are commonplace and frequent; these aren't just chance occurrences of different birds passing in the night via overlapping flyways. These feathered vectors are co-infected by 2 or more viruses at a time. Luck and the constraints of viral fitness are presumably the only things keeping H7N1, H5N9, H7N2 cases from dialing up in humans? What seems to be lacking is more molecular testing at the farms supplying the markets. Not just in Zhejiang, but all over the region.
As the authors noted, 100,000s of people visit these live bird markets each day and very few influenza cases seem to be due to them. Long may that last. But it's a tinderbox for which matches are already being struck; if the viruses should bud of that one-in-a-million variant that is enabled to readily spread from person-to-person, whooshka.
More testing guys, keep testing.
