Showing posts with label health care outreak. Show all posts
Showing posts with label health care outreak. Show all posts

Tuesday, 20 June 2017

Working for health can make you sick....

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Monday, 14 March 2016

Tread carefully when MERS-CoV stirs in hospitals as it can spiral out of control quickly..

In 2014 a stepwise increase in Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) cases preceded the largest healthcare facility outbreak of MERS to date. 

If you look at the most recent daily Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Ministry of Health report below,[1] you could be forgiven for thinking that there is currently a threatening rise in cases which could easily spiral out of control once again unless it is quickly stepped on.

Adding fuel to the fire is the fact that in Buraidah, in the province of Al Quassim , there has clearly been a healthcare-associated outbreak ticking over since November 2015 - patients, healthcare workers and relatively little camel contact make for a pretty clear picture.
When these fires are let smoulder in this way, they can quickly spread embers across the region and then cases fly out to other ports.
A week ago there were 8 cases reported in a day. That's far from the biggest reporting day we've seen in 3 MERS years (around 31 cases in a day n April '14), but it's still high. There have been 11 consecutive days with 2 -8 cases reported each day. The region in the map above has been the hotspot, but in the 12-March report there were 4 cases, each in a different city

There have also been an usually high number of camel mentions so far this MERS season. We do not usually see so many consecutive cases reported to have some form of camel contact. These are from cases across the KSA but also from United Arab Emirates- and Oman-acquired cases too. Is this because of a better understanding and acceptance of the role of camels in spreading MERS-CoV to humans, after research really hammered home the facts, or is it that more camels are infected, or there are more infected herds this season, are other animals becoming infected, or is it that, for some unknown reason, there is more contact between humans and infected camels/other animals this season?

There have been no viral gene or genome sequences from 2016 arriving on the interwebs yet, so we are left with a few of the old questions...again
  • is this all normal or is something different this time around?
  • has this season's MERS-CoV undergone a significant genetic change(s), affecting stability, tropism or transmission?
  • has infection control and prevention slipped again?
  • is there more contact with infected camels this year?
  • are increased camel descriptions an indication of better surveillance and questioning about camel contact?

Time to start watching and plotting MERS-CoV again.

References...

Friday, 8 January 2016

Research on MERS in South Korea seems fractured...

I would be remiss if I didn't point out that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is not the only country that can be seen as slow to initiate local research on local cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), MERS-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) or the epidemiology thereof.

The outbreak in South Korea began when an incubating person flew in from Qatar, arriving 4th May. He became ill while in South Korea, with symptoms beginning on the 11th May 2015. This was to become the largest MERS-CoV outbreak outside of the Arabian Peninsula and it is still to be investigated as the overarching single event that it really was. Scientific papers, letters, media and case reports all look at small groups of specimens, this or that specific hospital, a particular slice in time or an interesting group of cases and they reach a range of conclusions. But there appears to be no over-arching all-encompassing study of the outbreak. We did eventually see such a report from the KSA in its description of four dozen early MERS cases - 13 months after the first case became ill.[4] South Korea only had 185 cases in total (exporting one to southern China) so this should not be a great task.

A recent article in The Korea Times noted that "while the initial tests were conducted on a limited number of patients, research is underway to screen clinical specimens from 32 people that will help shed better light on the matter."[1] Well, perhaps a part of the matter. [1]
The article focusses on Spike gene mutations that were found in the MERS-CoV variants from 8 human cases - which is not a remarkable discovery and has been happening since we first saw sequenced MERS-CoV from humans (see "Tracking MERS-CoV through time: a spikey problem" [2]). 

The article also goes on to say that "There is a need to focus the country’s research capability on finding the reason for the change." Those will be dollars wasted since one cannot "find the reason" for a virus mutating because that is akin to asking why we exist. 

Scientific studies can determine that the variants have mutated at certain points and they can seek out whether those changes have any effect on the efficiency of viral replication, transmission or on our immune response to infection. This will be achieved by comparison to other non-mutated MERS-CoV variant viruses and will need more than one older variant to be included so as to encompass all of the different Spike gene mutations that have been determined to date. But these studies cannot find the reason for these mutations. Yes, that is a pedantic point.
We are about 6 months out from when the final MERS case first became ill in the South Korean outbreak. This media report sadly highlights that the world is still far away from seeing comparative experimental data defining whether or not there was anything special about the MERS-CoV variants in the outbreak. Strangely though, it has already been concluded that the rapid spread of MERS-CoV in South Korea was not due to viral changes but instead because of the poor control of transmission in healthcare settings.[3] That makes this report and its message to the public both a little stale and perhaps even unnecessarily alarming.

Clearly, the KSA was not alone in needing to improve its collaboration, communication and organization of research in response to the appearance of a new virus. 

References...

  1. http://www.koreatimesus.com/mutation-detected-in-s-korean-mers-virus-govt/
  2. http://virologydownunder.blogspot.com.au/2013/08/tracking-mers-cov-through-time-spikey.html
  3. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/situation-assessment/update-15-06-2015/en/
  4. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23891402