Showing posts with label antibody. Show all posts
Showing posts with label antibody. Show all posts

Tuesday, 20 October 2015

If you are often in contact with camels are you more likely to acquire MERS-CoV? [spoiler: yep]

This dromedary camel (DC)/Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) themed post is a quick review of a paper from 2015 by Reusken and a team of absolute champions in this space. 

It, as many have been, was published in the Emerging Infectious Disease journal, listed in its August issue (but online earlier) and entitled, Occupational Exposure to Dromedaries and Risk for MERS-CoV Infection, Qatar, 2013–2014.[1]

The study examined 498 sera from humans in Qatar split into different exposures types. Included were European (the Netherlands and Germany) human sera for use as controls - collected from a part of the world where there was not expected to have been any MERS-coronavirus (CoV) exposure and so no antibodies were expect to be present; a test for the tests.

As an aside, we've seen some great informative MERS-CoV/camel studies come out of Qatar. I love watching good collaborations pay dividends.

The 498 sera breakdown as follows:
  • 294 from those with daily DC exposure
    • Cohort A: 109 camel (A1; n=5) and sheep (A2; n=104) slaughterers
    • Cohort B: 8 central animal market (CAM) workers
    • Cohort C: 22 healthy males living & working at Al Shahaniya barn complex adjacent to DC race track
    • Cohort D: 155 healthy males living & working at DC farm
  • 204 from those without camel contact
    • Cohort E: 56 samples from construction workers
    • Cohort F: 10 people living in a complex with 200 sheep barns
    • Cohort G: 138 specificity testing samples (66 from the Netherlands and Germany who had recent CoV infection (G1) and 72 from the Netherlands obtained for Bordetella pertussis infection testing (G2)
The antibody testing regimen relied on a multi-tier approach (the best ones do, until we're sure that any single assay can cope with all the variables):
  • Tier 1: IgG antibodies were sought using the MERS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-CoV, human CoV (HCoV)-OC43 spike domain S1 antigen protein-microarray method used previously by this group [2]
    • 20/294 samples (6.8%) reacted (had IgG antibody in them) - none were from controls sera or from those without DC contact
    • 4/22 Cohort C, 8/155 Cohort D, 3/104 Cohort A2 and 4/5 Cohort A1 samples were reactive
    • All samples from A1, A2, B, C, D, E, F and G1 showed responses to HCoV-OC43 S1
    • None of 498 sera reacted to SARS-CoV S1
  • Tier 2: A 90% plaque reduction neutralization test (PRNT90 [4]) was used to show whether antibodies in samples could specifically stop MERS-CoV from infecting cells after sera and virus were co-incubated ahead of infection of a cell line
    • the 20 IgG reactive samples from Cohort A to D were tested and 10 were able to neutralize infection
    • 34/35 samples from those with camel contact (Cohorts A1, B and C) that were IgG non-reactive, also had no neutralizing antibody
  • "Tier 3": Use of a whole MERS-CoV immunofluorescence assay (IFA). However, the results from testing 8 reactive samples (5 of which were positive by IFA) were not included
This paper has a nice central finding which goes something like: if you don't have contact with camels, you don't get infected by MERS-CoV. If you do regularly have contact with camels - you are much more likely to get infected as determined by you having developed antibodies to that virus; you were infected but you fought off the infection. A similar finding came out of the larger serosurvey from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[3] 

I do wonder about the reactive sheep slaughterers though (Cohort A2) - where did those infections come from?  

The authors also addressed why other serologic studies of humans with occupational exposures have not found reactive sera-those studies hardly ever documented infected camels at the workplaces and there may not have been any (for some significant period of time presumably). More infected camels may be associated with more human infections. No surprise. The authors had found, outside this publication, that 60% of camels at the CAM and slaughterhouse were shedding MERS-CoV. This discrepancy has been a question of mine for a long while - and I like this answer.

Interestingly, the participants with antibodies don't recall being seriously sick. So you may get infected and just think you have the flu, or a cold, or nothing at all. This result may further confuse camel-deniers who do not have any background in the wide spectrum of outcomes one can expect after infection by any virus. Nonetheless, such apparently unnoticeable infections add more weight to the story that the current proportion of fatal cases is an exaggeration. So we learned yesterday that MERS (the disease) is rare, that camel contact makes up only a proportion of the likely sources of infection and now we see that you may not even get sick if you do get infected. A few things to digest there.

Also very interesting to me is that the neutralizing antibody titres were lower than had been found elsewhere. The authors suggest this may be due to these infections producing only mild disease. Without a prospective study though, it's very hard to be sure about the true disease severity - recall bias can be a pest. This is an area that needs a more focussed study; do our antibody tools detect mild and asymptomatic cases as reliably as severe MERS cases, for how long and in all cases of infection?

Its feels like its getting pretty hard to mount any realistic case for why we should ignore the role of camels in infecting us with MERS-CoV - even if they do so rarely, and perhaps often without serious complications.

References...
  1. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/21/8/15-0481_article
  2. http://virologydownunder.blogspot.com.au/2015/10/kenyan-camel-coronaviruses.html
  3. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(15)70090-3/abstract
  4. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(13)70164-6/abstract

Saturday, 17 October 2015

Kenyan camel coronaviruses...

Two studies have now found antibodies from Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)-like coronaviruses in dromedary camels (DCs). The "like" bit reflects that unless we have some sequence, we can't say for certain that the virus that infected those camels in the past, causing them to respond with these antibodies, was a MERS-CoV variant. The virus(es) may have been a different camel CoV that just so happens to share some antigens and is detected by MERS-CoV-"specific" antibody detection tests. The old story of "we don't know what we don't know" can perhaps be extended here to "we can't validate a test against viruses we haven't found yet". Or that may just be too nerdy.

Anyhoo, we have two papers to look at here. 

Antibodies against MERS coronavirus in dromedary camels, Kenya, 1992-2013

This paper went into the August edition of Emerging Infectious Diseases, authored by Corman and team (online much earlier but no way to track that thanks to no date of ePub ahead of print - loud sigh!) from Germany, Kenya, the Netherlands and Sweden.[1]

The introduction sets the scene for a paper seeking to know about where the MERS-CoV we know and love today, may have come from to be so common amongst camels. We suspect that this could be from another animal in its current form, or by recombination and mutation from a different ancestral form that has yet to be discovered in an animal (or human). This study seeks out MERS-CoV or a MERS-CoV like virus, or an ancestor, from camels in Kenya using their blood to look for footprints of previous infection - in this case, antibodies.

774 DC blood and stored sera collected from three regions of Kenya between 1992 and 2013 were subjected to a multi-step testing process:
  1. All samples, diluted 1:100, were screened using MERS-CoV spike protein subunit 1–based ELISA (rELISA; described before at [2])
    .228 of 774 (29%) were positive
  2. The 228, diluted 1:40, were next examined using a recombinant immunofluorescence assay using Vero cells expressing MERS-CoV spike protein (rIFA; described before at [3]
    .213 of 228 (93%; 28% of the 774) were still positive in the second tier of testing
  3. The third tier of testing of samples diluted between 1:80 and 1:800 used a highly specific MERS-CoV microneutralization assay (MNT assay; also previously described in [3])
    .119 of 213 (56%; 15% of the 774) had titres (dilutable levels) greater than or equal to 1:80 and 14 had titres above 800
    .Some counties of Kenya had 60-100% of samples test positive 
Figure 1. From Corman et al, Emerg Infect
Dis. 2014 Vol 20, No 8. 1319:1322.[1]
Click on image to enlarge.
North-eastern and northern regions generally had higher titres (Fig.1).These are regions closer to other countries with known antibody-positive camels (Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia). Further, nomadic camels from the East had higher antibody titres than those farmed in the north-west of the Rift Valley. Nomadic camels are taken across borders for trade.[2] DCs that had been kept isolated since 1998 were negative signs of past MERS-CoV virus. 

Adults had higher antibody levels than juveniles - presumably because infections happen when the DCs are young, producing the antibodies we detect in adult DCs.

Figure 2. Quote from [1]
Click on image to enlarge.
Camel density was also important. More camels were antibody positive in areas with higher densities of camels - also presumably because virus can spread better from one infected DC to others when more DC contacts are around. Similar story for humans, a contributing factor for those super-spreading conditions. The authors also made a comment that is very important to the answer the question of why human cases have not been found in areas with animal infections (see Figure 2).

Moving on to the next publication from Kenya.

Serological Evidence of MERS-CoV Antibodies in Dromedary Camels (Camelus dromedaries) in Laikipia County, Kenya

This one just came out on PLOS|ONE authored by Deem and colleagues from the United Stets of America, Kenya, New Zealand and the Netherlands.[4]

The introduction also reminds us that understanding MERS-CoV in camels in countries with herds, can help us assess and manage the risk for humans in those countries. In this case, Kenya has over 3 million DCs and mean and milk is worth $USD 11 million a year. These figures that may help you understand why DC interests don't want to have a significant human pathogen harboured by their animals.

This study is based in Laikipia County, almost in the centre of Kenya (Fig 1), which has a growing camel population. 

335 camels were sample from 9 easily accessed herds.

  1. All samples, diluted 1:20, were screened using a MERS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-CoV, human CoV (HCoV)-OC43 spike domain S1 antigen protein-microarray method used previously by this group [5,6,7,8,9]
    _46.9% of DCs were seropositive (had antibodies) including at least 1 animal per herd
    _60.8% of adult DCs were seropositive and 21.3% of the juvenile animals
    _bovine CoV (tested for by including the HCoV-OC43 antigens) seroprevalence was high, as it often is in DCs
    _this study did not see a significant difference in seroprevalence between nomadic herds or those managed in more commercial ways and no differences between different degrees of herd isolation
Figure 3. Quote from [4]
Click on image to enlarge.
The authors concluded that these herds were being exposed to MERS-CoV (or a similar virus) on an ongoing basis, even though they were not near borders and at lower densities that the more northern sites reported by the Corman et al. study above. They did not feel these disparities were due to diagnostic differences and that the DC densities in Lakipia County were sufficient to maintain virus circulation. 

The conclusion noted the need to get sequence from this virus or these viruses n order to see whether they are the MERS-CoV we know, a different clade of MERS-CoV variants or another virus entirely. That sort of information can't be gleaned from antibody studies and so RT-PCR methods are needed.

The report wrapped up with a comment about a lack of reporting of human cases (Fig.3).


Clearly, camels are commonly infected by MERS-CoV or a close relative in parts of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula which receives camel imports from Africa. 

Also very clearly, DCs survive the experience apparently fine and unharmed lending more support for MERS-CoV in DCs being just a "camel cold". The camels do not need to be culled the way we do to other ill virus-infected animals (I'm looking at you chooks with high pathogenicity influenza A(H5N1) virus..or other flu viruses). We just need to remove camels from humans - or better manage the interactions we have to have. It's not rocket science but it will take thoughtful, considered and collaborative discussions.

References...
  1. Antibodies against MERS coronavirus in dromedary camels, Kenya, 1992-2013
    Corman VM, Jores J, Meyer B, Younan M, Liljander A, Said MY, Gluecks I, Lattwein E, Bosch BJ, Drexler JF, Bornstein S, Drosten C, Müller MA.
    http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25075637
  2. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/6/14-0402_article
  3. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/4/13-1746_article
  4. Serological Evidence of MERS-CoV Antibodies in Dromedary Camels (Camelus dromedaries) in Laikipia County, Kenya
    Sharon L. Deem , Eric M. Fèvre, Margaret Kinnaird, A. Springer Browne, Dishon Muloi, Gert-Jan Godeke, Marion Koopmans, Chantal B. Reusken
    http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0140125
  5. http://virologydownunder.blogspot.com.au/2013/08/camels-carry-signs-of-coronavirus.html
  6. http://virologydownunder.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome.html
  7. http://virologydownunder.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/antibodies-in-10-year-old-uae-camel.html
  8. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(13)70164-6/abstract
  9. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/8/14-0590_article



Thursday, 12 June 2014

MERS-CoV in the blood....

The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is, at its core, a respiratory virus. Well, as far as we know it is anyway. But, like other respiratory viruses (see an earlier post on rhinoviruses), MERS-CoV can be detected in the blood....a so-called "viraemia". In some cases this is identified in other virus infections in parallel with the viral load being generally high, perhaps indicating that virus is replicating beyond the body's ability to contain and control it at the site of initial replication. 

Perhaps, and MERS-CoV may be a good example of this, so-called extra-respiratory spread of a respiratory virus occurs when it has a penchant for blood vessel cells (they present its receptor in their surface, or have something in their cellular machinery that aids virus replication) or some other ability to specifically get beyond the respiratory tract. 

However it occurs, the result is a much wider spread of the virus around the body; blood being something that is widely traveled! We already know that MERS-CoV has a love for growing in kidney cells so extra-respiratory spread may create a perfect storm for delivering this little bomb to a site where it can create even more havoc than in our airways. If those kidneys are already a bit bashed about, say by diabetes, then the blast radius is perhaps increased that much more.

A new paper just out in Emerging Infectious Diseases [1] is the latest to highlight viraemia, or pedantically because its viral RNA in the blood, RNAemia and its role in detection of MERS-CoV.

A lower respiratory tract (LRT) sample (bronchoalveolar lavage; BAL) was collected from a 66-year old man (66M) who returned to Tunisia after after a 5-week visit (20-March to 28-April) with his daughter in Qatar, interspersed with a pilgrimage to Mecca (Makkah; 27-March to 04-April) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). 

66M arrived back in Tunisia 28-April with an acute respiratory illness which progressed and from which the LRT sample was collected. A subsequent X-Ray identified cellular infiltrates in his lungs. His 30-year old daughter (30F) stayed in Qatar. His 34-year old son (34M), a nurse, cared for him both at home and later in the intensive care unit as his disease progressed, eventually ending in his death from multi-organ failure. He was buried 13-May and his daughter returned from Qatar for the funeral. 66M's LRT sample was not positive for MERS-CoV and he had no other respiratory viruses (not detected using PCR testing which may have been more appropriate). His daughter and son were positive for MERS-CoV so 66M was described as a "probable" case (travel, signs & symptoms, and at least subsequent contact with MERS-CoV cases). The incubation period for his illness placed 66M in Qatar at the likely time of acquisition of virus and his son was likely to have acquired his infection from his father in Tunisia. The daughter may have acquired the virus from her father while he was in Qatar or from a related source in Qatar (but seems to have been a Qatar-related acquisition of some sort). 66M's wife, 2 other well children and his son's wife were not MERS-CoV positive 5-weeks later (but then they were unlikely to have tested positive so far out from the event). 

Afterwards the US CDC tested a serum sample (tested 5-August-2013, blood taken 9-May-2013) by reverse transcription real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-rtPCR), and it was positive. Thus - the cluster is resolved. Got a better appreciation for the amount of work that goes into tracking this stuff down in detail?

But this was not the first time a MERS-CoV diagnosis was obtained retrospectively, or as part of a study, using RT-PCR (conventional or real-time) on serum (cell free blood) rather than a respiratory tract sample. Yet remember that the presence of viral genome (or bits thereof) identified by RT-PCR does not guarantee that infectious virus was in the blood, only that viral RNA could be detected there.
  • Case No. 1 from the original hospital cluster of MERS cases in Al-Zarqa, Jordan in March-May 2012, was identified thanks to retrospective RT-rtPCR (CDC version) on a convalescent serum sample.[2] 
  • The 2 French MERS cases (1 imported, 1 locally acquired from contact) had RNA in their blood (UpE RT-rtPCR); the patient who died was positive for at least 4-weeks while the surviving patient cleared viral RNA in the 1st week after symptom onset.[3] 
  • Two cases imported into the Netherlands from the KSA were found to have viral RNA in their blood for days; Case #1 from day-0 after diagnosis until at least day-9 and Case #2 from day-1 until at least day-5.[4] In this study viraemia outlasted virus detectability in the faeces but was detected for as long as virus in throat swabs of Case #1. RNA was not detected in the urine.[4]
Serum may be a useful sample, not just to determine whether antibodies to MERS-CoV develop(ed), but to help detect MERS-CoV RNA, as a surrogate for infectious virus, when a respiratory sample is not available. 

The finding of MERS-CoV RNA in the blood so frequently, among those studies that have looked, may also indicate it is a useful marker of disease severity as seen in the French cases. Serum is already a sample recommended for collection for antibody studies.[5] Let's see if these papers can trigger a little more looking back at those samples, which are hopefully stored in freezers somewhere. 

Anything that helps nail down "probable" cases and better define the pathogenesis of MERS-CoV is a good thing. 

Some typos & grammar corrected 05MAR2015

References.... 

  1. Family Cluster of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infections, Tunisia, 2013 http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/9/14-0378_article.htm
  2. Novel coronavirus infections in Jordan, April 2012: epidemiological findings from a retrospective investigation
    http://applications.emro.who.int/emhj/v19/Supp1/EMHJ_2013_19_Supp1_S12_S18.pdf
  3. Distinct Immune Response in Two MERS-CoV-Infected Patients: Can We Go from Bench to Bedside?
    http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0088716
  4. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections in two returning travellers in the Netherlands, May 2014
    http://www.eurosurveillance.org/images/dynamic/EE/V19N21/art20817.pdf
  5. http://who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/MERS_Lab_recos_16_Sept_2013.pdf?ua=1

Tuesday, 20 May 2014

MERS-CoV detections: The April wave recedes...

So welcome to the 114th Week of MERS-CoV among us. That week numbering may change shortly. Stay tuned if week numbering is your thing.

We currently have a tally of 649 detections of MERS-CoV or viral antibodies in humans. I don't list camel numbers. My count says 192 fatalities among infected people, resulting in a proportion of fatal cases of 29.6%. That seems high. Because, until very recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Health did not regularly report deaths alongside their date of illness onset, it has been an interesting hobby to try and link them. The number is solid so along as the MOH has not been doubling up in the reporting or coming back later to re-report deaths. You'll be familiar with these issues if you follow me on Twitter.

I made a point of saying antibodies earlier because I am going to be including these sorts of laboratory data in my tally when produced by trustworthy laboratories who have described their methods and shown some validation data and an understanding of what the cross-reaction issues are when dealing with MERS-CoV serology. This will be despite the current WHO MERS case definition not allowing for inclusion of people who only have antibody but no virus or viral RNA detected in their samples. There may be some hiccups with MERS-CoV antibody testing along the way, but we need these data in humans and it's good to see the wheels rolling on this at last.
[One of those hiccups occurred 28-May-2014, when the test result from an Illinois man who had originally tested positive in an Ab test, was retracted.]

In my estimation though, serology (the testing of human sera for antibodies against a virus here, the main target being IgG which takes a couple of weeks to become detectable after infection) is a much more reliable way of defining an infection by MERS-CoV virus than by relying on patient recall bias of symptoms 2-weeks ago, or from directly observing signs and symptoms that are nondescript and difficult to distinguish, alone. The latter approach has been the mainstay of identifying cases of human infection for a very long time; still is. This approach is especially important during times of outbreak and pandemic when labs are swamped by testing requests and it must be assumed that cases are due to the bug of interest; if it looks like a camel, slobbers like a duck and walks like a duck, then it is a MERS-CoV infection yeah? No. If you can clinically characterise and laboratory test then you will more often know the virus the patient has/had than if you don't test. But I'm sure that's clear to everyone anyway.

For MERS, as for H1N1pdm09 influenza and perhaps SARS, finding a reliable pathognomonic set of signs or symptoms capable of reliably distinguishing a respiratory virus of interest from another virus capable of the same disease is not possible. These viruses cause a spectrum of illness. Testing is paramount if you want to know what's there and to address other aspects relevant to public health during an infectious disease cluster/outbreak/pandemic. There are a couple of issues here (at least!)...

From a patient management perspective, who really cares what is making my patient very ill anyway? It really doesn't matter right now if it's this respiratory virus or that one; there are few vaccines and I don't have an antiviral for most of them anyway. I and my healthcare team are already taking respiratory infection precautions and I just want to direct my supportive therapy and resources to the problems they have, right? I'll be (well...you, experienced medical types of which I am not one) doing that before many lab results show up anyway. 

From the perspective of interrupting and understanding viral transmission however, nondescript signs and symptoms are a nightmare. And in the early days of a new virus where we seem to know very little about what path(s) transmission is taking (and perhaps we're also learning some more about those possibilities in general), any infection by whatever method it is empirically determined should, I believe, be recorded as an infection in order to provide the biggest picture possible; a process we have seen unfolding in the United States with its 2 3 detections (1 locally transmitted) of MERS-CoV or its spiky little footprints.
THIS RESULT WAS RETRACTED 28-May-2014 FOLLOWING A NEGATIVE NEUTRALIZING ANTIBODY TESTING.

Given that many viruses cannot be distinguished by signs and symptoms alone, a clinical diagnosis to define a case is less reliable than any pathogen-specific laboratory test. I hope the WHO alters their case definition in the near future. Infectious disease is always teaching us - seems we learned a heap from SARS but even the relatively a few cases of MERS are presenting interesting issues and testing us in new ways. 
[While the US antibody-positive result above has since been retracted, I stand by these comments-Ab testing requires rigor, but that can be provided using several assays and applying a good understanding of Ab technologies and limitations to produce reliable results]

Anyhooooo...been stewing on that for a few days apparently. Let's move on and have a look at the 3 updated charts below. 

We are definitely through to the other side of the Jeddah outbreak (see weeklies chart). While cases do keep accruing each and every day (see dailies chart from 20-March), the downward trend of smaller numbers of illness onsets each day also continues. 

Weekly MERS-CoV detections.
Click to enlarge.

Daily MERS-CoV detections from 20-March.
Click to enlarge.

For perspective on the size and the influence of what 1 hospital cluster can turn into and how that can influence how a virus "looks", take a gander at the extent of the April outbreak. Case are still falling out into April as we get more data. If you look at the monthlies chart at the bottom, I've readjusted that y-axis scale again such that it's maximum value is now 10x higher (350 vs 35) than the scale used for 2012 or 2013's charts. May's tally is currently 4x greater than any month from 2012 or 2013. 

What does MERS-CoV hold for us in the coming months? 

Daily detections of MERS-CoV, 2012-current.
Click to enlarge. 

Monthly detection of MERS-CoV 2012-current.
Click to enlarge.


Friday, 4 April 2014

Can we believe every H7N9 seroprevalence study we see?

Special Guest writer: @influenza_bio

A little over a year ago, the first known human patient got sick with avian influenza virus(H7N9). The number of H7N9 cases rose and fell in the spring of 2013, and a total of 134 people were known to have contracted H7N9 before June, 2013. Since then, sporadic cases appeared in the summer and fall, and by the end of December, 2013, new cases started to pick up again. We have now seen a second wave rise and fall, although several new cases still being reported each week. As of the time of this writing, just over 400 people are known to have been infected with H7N9. The case fatality rate (CFR) – roughly speaking, the percentage of people infected with H7N9 who die from it – for these known cases is almost 40%.

One question that is on a lot of people's minds is, how many other H7N9 cases are out there that we don't know about? How many mild cases are there that never get tested? How many asymptomatic cases are there that are missed? If there were a lot of undetected cases out there, that would mean that H7N9 is a lot less fatal than the known cases would make us think. On the other hand, if we were somehow miraculously seeing every single actual case, then the CFR would be as bad as all of these cases make it out to be. (And imagine what the CFR would be like without hospitals, ventilators and oseltamivir!)

How do we find out if there are cases that we're missing? One way is to do what is called a seroprevalence study. This means collecting blood samples from as wide a swath of a population as possible and testing to see how many of these samples have antibodies to H7N9. Antibodies are molecules that are made by cells of the immune system and that stick to specific pathogens to help our bodies to rid themselves of these pathogens. If someone gets sick with H7N9 influenza, his or her body would most likely continue to produce a significant amount of antibodies specifically against that strain for at least a good number of months after infection and possibly much longer. In general, people who are infected with influenza but who do not develop symptoms will also produce such antibodies, but their bodies will make fewer of them, and, on average, they won't make as many of them for as long. We don't know exactly what the pattern of antibody production is for people who are infected with H7N9 but don't develop symptoms, though, because researchers haven't identified enough of these individuals to study.

It is very important that we get these seroprevalence studies right. If they're done wrong and we miss a lot of cases, then we will simultaneously underestimate how common H7N9 cases are and overestimate how deadly the strain is. On the other hand, if seroprevalence studies are done wrong and we think a lot of people were infected with H7N9 when they weren't, then we will overestimate how common H7N9 cases are but underestimate how deadly the strain is. Facts can help us to respond to H7N9, and if we get the facts wrong, then we can't respond properly. For example, if we come to think mild H7N9 cases are far more numerous than the severe ones that actually get diagnosed, then we might not worry as much about H7N9 as we should.

What I'd like to talk about here are some of the important ways that seroprevalence studies can go wrong. To answer my title question, no, we cannot always believe the conclusions of every seroprevalence study we see. Scientists make mistakes, just like everyone else, and sometimes things just go wrong, too. I'd like for you to understand just how some of these mistakes can arise, so that you can better judge for yourself whether a study is likely to be reliable or not, or so that you can at least know that there are things out there that can go wrong.

How are seroprevalence studies done?

There are 2 types of laboratory assays (tests) that are usually used in seroprevalence studies (although there are others): hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays1 and microneutralization (MN) assays.2 (For more information about the HI assay in general, see a nice description by Dr. Racaniello.3) MN assays are considered better (more sensitive and specific) than HI assays, but they are harder to do. MN assays require a significant amount of extra work at the end that HI assays don't. But, more importantly for H7N9 studies, HI assays can be done with either "killed," modified or "live" virus, whereas MN assays require "live" H7N9 virus. In other words, HI assays can be done in almost any lab, but MN assays require a BSL-3 lab. A neutralization assay4 has been developed that uses a "pseudovirus" instead of live H7N9 and is therefore far less hazardous to work with, but formal WHO diagnostic criteria still require standard HI and/or MN assays.

First, blood samples are collected. Each blood sample is drawn into a tube, and after 15-30 minutes, the tube is centrifuged to separate clotted red blood cells from the rest of the blood. The red blood cells are discarded; what's left is called serum, and that's what's studied. The serum samples should then be put in a refrigerator if they'll be studied within a few days; if they'll be studied later, they should be frozen. Once a researcher is ready to study the serum samples, the serum samples are thawed. Virus is also used for the assay, so one or more tubes of virus are thawed, too. Different types of mammalian or bird cells are prepared: typically horse, turkey or chicken red blood cells for HI assays, or a special type of dog kidney cells ("MDCK" cells) for MN assays. Various solutions are prepared. Serum samples, virus preparations and cells are diluted as needed, and everything is transferred into little wells in a plastic "plate" in just the right way. In the HI assay, the plate then sits at room temperature for 1 hour, after which it is "read" by eye. In the MN assay, the plate then sits at 37°C (body temperature) for 19-21 hours, after which it is read by a machine (an "ELISA reader"). The assay is done. The results of the assay are then written down and analyzed, and voilà, a paper appears in the scientific literature.

What could possibly go wrong with these blood tests?


Let's start with some things that can go wrong with the lab work:
  1. If blood samples are left sitting around for a long time without being centrifuged, the red blood cells will start to break apart, and enzymes released from the red blood cells will start to destroy antibodies (and everything else) in the blood samples. This happens even faster if blood samples are not refrigerated.
  2. If serum samples are left in the fridge too long, things can start to deteriorate, just like food in your fridge would. The antibodies that you would like to measure start to be broken down. (Sometimes, for many different kinds of studies, people study serum samples left over after patients' blood tests at hospitals. Those samples sometimes sit around in a fridge for quite a while. Some of them can even be green from stuff growing in them while they're sitting around. Yuck.)
  3. If plasma (what's left in blood after unclotted red blood cells are removed) is used instead of serum (what's left in blood after clotted red blood cells are removed), then the assay can read artificially high. Serum should always be used, not plasma.
  4. Every time serum is frozen and thawed, some of the antibodies are effectively destroyed. This should not be done over and over. Serum samples should be put into the right size tubes that the researcher will want to use, so that the samples are put through only 1-2 "freeze-thaw cycles" before they are tested. And all serum samples should go through the same number of freeze-thaw cycles.
  5. The same thing is true for virus samples used in MN assays. A single freeze-thaw cycle can reduce virus infectivity by a factor of 10. Virus samples also need to be kept on ice when they're being worked with.
  6. The plate can be read wrong. It's hard to imagine reading an HI assay plate wrong, but a special procedure (ELISA) and special equipment (ELISA plate reader) are used in the MN assay, and ELISA assays can go wrong.
But, hopefully all of that was done right. Not all researchers, students and technicians are created equal, but hopefully the lab "PI" (Principal Investigator; the person running the lab) is competent and ensures that everyone is doing things correctly.

What could go wrong with the data analysis?

What else could go wrong? The data analysis might not be done correctly. And it's here where perfectly good data can be ruined and where you have to look at seroprevalence studies most closely.

Suppose you've measured your antibody amounts ("titers") in your serum samples. How do you decide which titers mean the sample came from someone who was infected with H7N9, and which titers mean they didn't? Do you just pick a number out of thin air? If you don't have data to tell you which titers mean what, then all you are doing is measuring antibody levels in a population, and you can make no interpretation about what those levels mean. You can't say that they mean any people have or have not been infected with H7N9 at all.

Instead, you need actual measurements using serum samples from people who are known to have been infected with H7N9 to tell you what your titers mean. Someone has to study a number of patients to see what their actual H7N9 antibody titers are, and then a mathematical analysis of that data is done to come up with a threshold titer value, above which serum samples can be said to have come from people infected with H7N9 with some large degree of certainty, and below which they are thought to have come from people who were not infected. We've seen almost no asymptomatic cases (cases with no symptoms), so we really can't say much about them. So we have to go with data from H7N9 patients who have had symptoms. Here's a great graph showing antibody titers, as measured using the HI assay, in serum samples from H7N9 patients:5

Figure 1. H7N9 HI
Euro Surveill. 2013 Dec 12;18(50):20657

As you can see in the graph above (Figure 1), by around 3 weeks after infection onset, all samples from patients whose HI titer was measured had titers 40.

The graph below (Figure 2), from a different study,4 shows that the HI titer for all H7N9 samples studied by this set of authors was also 40. In addition, this graph shows titers from "control" samples (i.e., samples from people who did not have H7N9 infections); all control samples had titers that were <40.

Figure 2: H7N9 IC50 HI4
Emerg Infect Dis. 2013 Oct;19(10):1685-7

Finally, below (Figure 3) is another nice graph, from a third study,6 showing anti-H7N9 antibody levels ("IgG"), "HI" assay results and MN assay ("NAb") results for several H7N9 patients, again showing that all samples from the H7N9 patients studied had HI titers 40. This graph also shows that all H7N9 patient serum samples had an MN titer of 20, if samples were taken after enough time had elapsed since their infections had started.

Figure 3. H7N9 IgG HI NAb.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Feb;20(2):192-200

In other words, if an individual's anti-H7N9 antibody titer is 40 by the HI assay or 20 by the MN assay, these data suggest that we could pretty safely say that he or she has had a symptomatic H7N9 infection within the past few months, and if the HI or MN titers are below those cutoffs, then the individual probably hasn't had a symptomatic H7N9 infection. We don't know to what extent asymptomatic H7N9 infections will be captured by these cutoffs, but it is likely that some asymptomatic cases would be missed using these cutoffs. It is also possible that some mild infections could be missed using these cutoffs. However, it would be a great step forward just to get estimates of what percentages of any regional population or occupational group of people have had any kind of H7N9 infection. A comparison of antibody titers for asymptomatically infected and symptomatically infected H5N1 cases may be instructive when thinking about H7N9.7

WHO guidelines are even stricter than the cutoffs discussed in the paragraph above. WHO guidelines say that, using the HI assay, only single samples with titers of 160 can be considered "seropositive": "Paired sera (acute and convalescent sera) with a 4-fold rise in HI titer or single sera collected in convalescent phase with HI titer of ≥160 could be considered as H7N9 HI antibody positive. Sera with HI titer of 20-80 should be confirmed by MN or WB assay."1 For the MN assay, however, the WHO does not give specific cutoffs: "With single-serum samples, care must be taken in interpreting low titers such as 20 and 40. Generally, knowledge of the antibody titers in an age-matched control population is needed to determine the minimum titer that is indicative of a specific antibody response to the virus used in the assay."2

Now, it should be noted that WHO assay instructions recommend the use of horse red blood cells for the HI assay, and not everyone uses horse red blood cells. Some people use chicken, turkey, guinea pig or other kinds of red blood cells. That starts making comparisons between different groups' assays difficult. Horse red blood cells are better to use than turkey red blood cells for H7N9 because they have more a2,3-linked ("bird") sialic acids (influenza receptors); HI results are more sensitive with horse red blood cells. In other words, it may take less antibody in the assays to get the same result using horse red blood cells than it would using turkey red blood cells. This would translate into a higher number, when discussing H7N9 patient titers, for HI assays using horse red blood cells, compared to assays using turkey red blood cells. I have not seen direct comparisons of titers obtained using different types of red blood cells in HI assays specifically for H7N9, but the situation is probably similar to that for H5N1.8

Figures 1 and 3 above were made with HI data obtained using horse red blood cells. Figure 2 used guinea pig red blood cells. Are they completely comparable? No. Are they pretty comparable? Yes.

Are you getting a feeling for how complicated it is to interpret a seroprevalence paper? And for how difficult it is to compare results across studies?

Why does all of this matter?

It matters because some seroprevalence studies don't use appropriate cutoffs. And because it can be hard to determine even what an appropriate cutoff is when red blood cells from different species are used in an HI assay. This is where the reader has to be really careful. Cutoffs for seropositivity have been a big issue9 with H5N1 seroprevalence studies; some researchers have used cutoffs that were too low, and hence they have almost certainly overestimated how common H5N1-specific antibodies were in the populations studied.

So far, only one H7N9 serology paper published to date has reported probable seropositive samples, and this paper simply reported HI titers without using any specific threshold for seropositivity. Only one used study horse red blood cells in HI assays. The one paper that used an MN assay did use appropriate cutoffs. It should be noted that the new WHO HI guidelines were only published in December, 2013, after a couple of these papers were already published.

Here are the studies that have been published so far (I hope I haven't left any out):

  1. Bai et al.10 looked at serum samples collected before November, 2012 from poultry workers in eastern China and found no H7N9-positive samples. The study used HI and MN assays. Turkey red blood cells were used in the HI assay. Appropriate cutoffs were used for the MN assay.
  2. Hsieh et al.11 studied 14 close contacts of the first H7N9 case in Taiwan. The authors took blood samples within 18-28 days after the contacts' earliest exposures. The authors used an HI assay but not an MN assay. They used turkey red blood cells for the HI assay. They found all contacts to have an HI titer £10, and declared all to be seronegative. The HI titer for the H7N9 patient in their study was 1:80. These conclusions seem very sound.
  3. Yang et al.12 looked at serum samples from 1129 people from regions of China in which H7N9 cases had been seen, and from 396 poultry workers from 10 districts in which H7N9 cases had been seen. None of the samples from the general population was found to be seropositive, whereas >6% of the poultry workers were found to be seropositive. The authors also examined serum samples from several H7N9 patients. The study used an HI assay but not an MN assay. The authors used a cutoff of 80, along with turkey red blood cells, for the HI assay. Because the authors examined serum samples from H7N9 patients using their methods and got results that are reasonably similar to other results, their cutoffs are most likely reasonable, and their conclusions are probably quite sound. The authors report:
    • "Of the 1129 serum samples collected from individuals (age range, 1–88 years) in the general population, 9 (0.8%) had an HI titer of≥40 to influenza A(H7N9), but no serum samples with an HI titer of≥80 were found (Table 1). In contrast, among poultry workers, 13.9% (55/396) and 6.3% (25/396) had influenza A(H7N9) antibody titers of ≥40 and ≥80 (20 had an HI titer of 80, and 5 had an HI titer of 160), respectively."

      It is hard to imagine that an HI titer of 160 can be a spurious finding ("non-specific," to the initiated). Thus, these data strongly suggest that at least some H7N9 cases have been going undetected among poultry workers. Suppose we consider only the poultry workers with HI titer ≥80, or 6.3% of the poultry workers. If we then consider how many poultry workers there are, total, in districts from which H7N9 cases have emerged, then this study suggests that it's possible that quite a large number of poultry workers have been exposed to H7N9. Still, this study examined only a very small number of people, and we should be cautious about reading too much into these results.
  4. Qiu et al.13 looked at 3 H7N9 patients and 3 close household contacts of the patients who were exposed before infection control practices were put in place. The authors looked for viral RNA using a sensitive test (PCR) and examined serum samples drawn 15-26 days post-exposure using both an HI assay and a pseudovirus-based neutralization assay. They found no contacts to be seropositive. The H7N9 patients had HI titers that reached 160-640 during this time, and the patient contacts all had titers <10. The authors used horse red blood cells for the HI assay. These findings also seem sound.
To summarize, the conclusions from all of these papers do seem sound. But, it would be wise to keep all of these issues in mind as subsequent studies appear over time.

An additional study14 looked at antibody titers in 1723 serum samples collected in Vietnam using a very different kind of assay (a protein microarray). Because seropositivity cutoff levels had not been determined with authors' assay methods using actual H7N9 patient samples, these authors were appropriately very careful not to attempt to draw any conclusions about H7N9 seroprevalence from their data:

"Because titers calculated from our assay are not directly comparable to HI or microneutralization tests, no cutoff is chosen to represent positivity or clinical protection. It is not possible to associate these titers with past exposure or past infection, as serological assays have not yet been validated for H7N9."

For the future

So, as new H7N9 serology studies gradually come out, you be the judge. Figure out whether they're believable or not. Ask yourself the following:
  1. What assay(s) were used? Did the authors use an MN assay? They get bonus points if they did. 
    • If only an HI assay was used, then the conclusions are slightly less certain than if an MN assay was used.
  2. If the authors used an HI assay, what species were the red blood cells from?
    • If horse red blood cells weren't used, then HI titer cutoffs lower than 160 are probably appropriate, but there is also more uncertainty about what an appropriate cutoff would be.
  3. What cutoff(s) did they use for seropositivity in their assay(s)? Do these cutoffs mesh with WHO guidelines? Do they mesh with what we know about H7N9 patient HI and MN antibody titers?
References
  1. http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/cnic_serological_diagnosis_hai_a_h7n9_20131220.pdf
  2. http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/cnic_serological_diagnosis_microneutralization_a_h7n9.pdf
  3. http://www.virology.ws/2009/05/27/influenza-hemagglutination-inhibition-assay/
  4. Qiu C, Huang Y, Zhang A, Tian D, Wan Y, Zhang X, Zhang W, Zhang Z, Yuan Z, Hu Y, Zhang X, Xu J. Safe pseudovirus-based assay for neutralization antibodies against influenza A(H7N9) virus. Emerg Infect Dis. 2013 Oct;19(10):1685-7
  5. Zhang A, Huang Y, Tian D, Lau EH, Wan Y, Liu X, Dong Y, Song Z, Zhang X, Zhang J, Bao M, Zhou M, Yuan S, Sun J, Zhu Z, Hu Y, Chen L, Leung CY, Wu JT, Zhang Z, Zhang X, Peiris JS, Xu J. Kinetics of serological responses in influenza A(H7N9)-infected patients correlate with clinical outcome in China, 2013. Euro Surveill. 2013 Dec 12;18(50):20657 
  6. Guo L, Zhang X, Ren L, Yu X, Chen L, Zhou H, Gao X, Teng Z, Li J, Hu J, Wu C, Xiao X, Zhu Y, Wang Q, Pang X, Jin Q, Wu F, Wang J. Human antibody responses to avian influenza A(H7N9) virus, 2013. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Feb;20(2):192-200
  7. Buchy P et al., PLoS One. 2010 May 27;5(5):e10864
  8. See, e.g., Table 4 in Pawar SD et al., Virol J. 2012 Oct 30;9:251
  9. Osterholm MT and Kelley NS, MBio. 2012 Feb 24;3(2):e00045-12
  10. Bai T et al., N Engl J Med. 2013 Jun 13;368(24):2339-40
  11. Hsieh SM et al., J Infect. 2013 Nov;67(5):494-5
  12. Yang S et al., J Infect Dis. 2014 Jan 15;209(2):265-9
  13. Qiu C et al., J Clin Virol. 2014 Feb;59(2):129-31
  14. Boni MF et al., J Infect Dis. 2013 Aug 15;208(4):554-8

NOTE: I did not have a hand in writing this post and thus take no credit for it. This was entirely the work of the Guest Writer. 

Thursday, 30 January 2014

MERS-CoV antibodies in dromedary camels from Dubai, UAE, as far back as 2005...

Alexandersen and colleagues from Canada and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), writing in Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, recently described detecting antibodies to the MERS-CoV, or a close relative 

Their study is distinguished from similarly themed reports because it uses camel serum samples which are not as diluted. The thinking is that these may yield better indications of weaker positives

It also differs in that it has not undertaken all the various validation steps used in many of the antibody studies I've listed below, to convince the dubious reader that positive results are not due to some other coronavirus that may be yielding a cross-reactive and thus falsely negative result.

MERS-CoV RT-PCRs were negative on extracts of serum aliquots.

The authors could not determine where or how the camels may have been exposed to infection, other than it had been prior to the beginning of sampling in 2005. 6 camels from North America ("likely" originating from Australia) were antibody-negative reinforcing the fairly localised nature of MERS-CoV's (or it's close relative) likely origin.

So far we've read of antibodies in camels that are not convincingly present in other animals including sheep, goats, chickens, cattle, horses or camels from outside Europe, America or Australia. These antibodies react with, and sometimes neutralise the infectivity of, MERS-CoV (or a very close relative). This list now includes dromedary camels from:


With this much data behind us, camels currently sit at the top of the MERS-CoV (or some other novel CoV)-positive "animals-tested-to date" list.