US CDC testing retrospectively for MERS in Jordan.

I'm little slow on this day old story. Jordan was the site of the first MERS-CoV cases, confirmed retrospectively by NAMRU-3 (see MERS page; Cluster #1). 

The US CDC has been sent 124 samples by the Jordan Ministry of Health from around that time to help further investigate the source of the (as far as we know) first outbreak. 

The 2 cases that had been confirmed were healthcare workers, including an intensive care unit nurse. This strongly suggests at least 1 patient with the unexplained pneumonia occurring in Jordan around April 2012, was a source of the MERS-CoV.
Raises the question of what Hajj 2012 serum samples would reveal?

Moroccan MERS?

ProMED says a news report has been confirmed by the head of the Moroccan Health Defense Network. 

However, FluTrackers has a report that this has been denied by the Moroccan Health Ministry and that samples from the UAE national showing relevant clinical features, were negative for MERS-CoV.

Poultry workers had no prior exposure to H7N9 [UPDATED]

Bai and colleagues report in NEJM that 1,544 samples collected from young adult poultry workers between Jan-Nov 2012 in 4 key provinces/municipalities of China (municipality of Shanghai, Zhejiang province, Jiangsu province and Anhui province) were tested using a haemagglutinin-inhibition (HAI) assay and a microneutralization (MN) assay. 

The HAI assay found some weak reactivity (antibody was positive when diluted as far as 1:40), but no neutralizing antibodies were found by MN test. 

This is chapter 1 of a story that next needs to include more contemporary testing. 

The first part reveals no assay-specific antibodies present in these close contacts of poultry, prior to late 2012; before the H7N9 outbreak.

Nothing unusual about MTAs-are commenters just confused?

Material transfer agreements are more the norm than the exception among scientist used to local an d international collaborations whether working with exotic new viruses - or endemic seasonal viruses from the recent or distant past. 

An article in Science's ScienceInsider goes into more detail about the recent fracas. Perhaps some just don't understand the difference between MTAs, IP, business and public health needs?

It's worth noting that even if I wanted a sample of a common cold virus stored more than 50 years ago and now housed and maintained in one of the world's leading biological banks of such samples, I would have to sign an MTA that imposes restrictions on its downstream use. You can read the whole thing here...one excerpt....

ATCC Material and Progeny: ATCC Material and Progeny may only be used by Purchasers Investigator for research purposes and only in Investigators laboratory.

5 new MERS-CoV cases come from nowhere.

The Saudi Ministry of Health effusive detail below..

Within the framework of the epidemiological surveillance of the novel Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), the Ministry of Health (MOH) has announced that five novel Coronavirus cases have been recorded among citizens in the Eastern Region, ranging in age from 73 to 85 years, but they have all chronic diseases.

That's not an excerpt. That's all of it. Even Coulson wouldn't be that reserved.

Imported French MERS case dies.

Reuters reports that the 65M who contracted MERS-CoV while travelling in Dubai has died. 

He shared a room with a 50M who subsequently contracted the virus and remains in hospital. With the new case above, the case fatality rate sits to 47%.

H7N9 in Beijing.

Busy night. According to crofsblogs and Avian Flu Diary, Beijing has reported a new case of H7N9 in a 6M, confirmed 28.05.13. This makes 133 cases and 37 deaths-3 in Beijing when including an asymptomatic lab confirmation.
This case comes after Beijing rolled H7N9 into its normal influenza virus laboratory testing system and one of China's leading respiratory virus researchers noted the need to remain vigilant about H7N9.

H7N9: airborne transmission not at pandemic levels - infects upper & lower airways, lymph nodes and brain in ferrets.

In a collaborative effort published last week in Science, researchers from China, Canada and the US infected ferrets with a human H7N9 isolate (A/Shanghai/2/2013; "SH2"). The aim was to understand infection, transmission and pathogenicity due to the virus in the main mammalian model for such studies.

Ferrets showed upper respiratory tract disease, similar to that due to influenza A(H1N1)pdm 2009 virus infection, with shedding beginning the day after nasal inoculation - preceding any signs of disease. Obvious ramifications for stealthy spread of virus in this prodromal phase

Infected ferrets housed in the same cage as a non-infected ferret (introduced 24-hours after the the infection of the first occupants) easily transmitted SH2 to the newcomer who showed signs of illness within 36-hours; the same time at which lung inflammation and virus replication in nasal, tracheal, bronchiolar, lymph node and brain tissues was occurring. All these ferrets produced a diagnostic rise in antibodies by 14 days (They seroconverted).

An uninfected ferret in a downwind cage, separated by 10cm, acquired and shed SH2 at 36-hours after exposure (1 animal in 3 experiments). This ferret and one other seroconverted at 14 days post-exposure.

Airborne transmission was therefore possible in two-thirds of exposures in these experiments. H1N1pdm 2009 infected ferrets all shed virus regardless of route of infection confirming practically that H7N9 has some way to go to spread on a par with a known pandemic influenza virus.

Pigs also supported H7N9 infection showing signs and symptoms of disease 0.5 days after virus load was measurable. Direct contact H7N9 transmission was possible with an antibody rise occurring in 25% (1 of 4) of pigs but no virus shedding. No airborne transmission was detectable in the pigs. H1N1pdm 2009 virus was spread efficiently by direct and airborne routes in pigs.

Perhaps pigs are not the universal intermediary mixing vessel they are made out to be - being more susceptible to humanised influenza viruses than those closer to their avian hosts?

No new H7N9 cases for 2nd week.

Self explanatory., There was on death in the week spanning 20.05 to 27.05. 76 cases have recovered now and 37 died. The numbers I'm able to update (once again there are not details) are on the H7N9 page.

EV-A71 in cases of Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP), Australia.

ProMED describes a report from researchers at the Australian National Enterovirus Reference Laboratory on 5 cases of AFP positive for EV-A71 between Jan-May 2013. The viruses, found in stool samples from ill children, were identified as belonging to the more virulent genogroup, C4a, by VP1 sequencing.

Members of genogroup C4 were described by van der Sanden and colleagues as being restricted to epidemics in the Asian Pacific region.